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Prologue
It is to be noted at the outset of this paper that the interlocutors in the
following exchange regarding the rescue of frozen embryos are men and
women who are all manifestly committed to remaining faithful to the
Magisterium of the Catholic Church. We do not here examine the positions
of the Church's champions vs. dissenters.
Certainly one side of the debate is in error. But at this point, i.e., prior
to a definitive decision from Rome, the exchange is still intramural. That
fact alone is quite refreshing and gives one the sense that here is true
theology at work, unfolding, as it should, the principles of faith and reason
and applying them to a new and previously unforeseen circumstance. How
different this is from those ill-fated attempts at dismantling Catholic
teaching under the guise of theological research!
Introduction
This paper constitutes a continuation and elaboration of a previous
work completed in the Winter of 1999, entitled, "The Fate of Frozen
Embryos." The paper was written as a response to proposals in some
quarters that women could or should offer their wombs to gestate the
abandoned spare embryos resultant from in vitro fertilization procedures.
Although it did consider attendant issues related to artificial
reproduction, the essential focus of the paper was to examine the question
whether or not "rescuing" a frozen embryo by "embryo transfer" (ET) is to
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be deemed intrinsically evil. The tentative conclusion of that previous
work was the following:
Firstly, it seems to me that despite the genuine reservations
expressed by so many regarding the embryos' "rescue" by volunteer
"mothers," those reservations do not establish that such a procedure
is intrinsically evil. Therefore, this path should be taken out of
respect for the poor souls trapped in thi s macabre frozen prison.
Other measures should be taken to eliminate the evil but accidental
consequences that could arise as a result.
Secondly, I hold that the object of the act is neither surrogate
motherhood nor adoption , but rather is the rescue of the child.
Neither does it seem absolutely necessary that the child be adopted
by the rescuing woman, although that is clearly preferable.
Nevertheless, the rescue should not be undertaken unless adequate
provisions are made for the care of the child after birth.
Thirdly, the option of baptism should be taken, but only for those
embryos that are in imminent danger of being killed or are manifestly
moribund. The death of the child would be an indirect but foreseen
side effect of the baptism. There is due proportionality between the
good and evil effects in that the salvation of the child's soul would be
secured. I

Since these conclusions were drawn, further arguments have
emerged which warrant a fresh consideration of these conclusions. Those
arguments focus most directly upon the act of embryo transfer as being an
offense against the institution of marriage - most precisely against marital
chastity, exclusivity and fidelity. They have the common characteristic of
shifting the focus of the debate from the absolute inviolability of the life of
these poor embryos to the "reproductive integrity" of the volunteer mother
and the rights of her husband. In other words, instead of seeing this
dilemma through the colored glasses of the noble and legitimate desire to
save the babies, they take a hard and sober look at what the implications
are for the woman who is involved. However, the following observations
are meant not so much as an attempt to close the debate as to incorporate
these new voices and offer a commentary on the strengths and weaknesses
of their points.

The Underlying Debate
A review of the arguments reveals that the true underlying debate that
this question has elicited is one regarding the identification of the Jontes
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moralitatis. Most precisely it is a debate about how one correctly
articulates the end or the object of the act itself.
Not all have identified this point explicitly. Some we believe have
rather focused on the circumstances or consequences of the "rescuing" of
frozen embryos. But the real problem is determining the object of the act.
And so this paper could be instead a short treatise on that question in the
abstract: how does one identify the object of an act? It would seem
superfluous to suggest this to readers trained in moral theology were it not
for the fact that the sound minds involved in this debate come up with such
varying conclusions concerning this point.
But despite the fact that the real debate is one of identifying the object of
the act, it is worth considering some accidental arguments as well. This is
because if a certain type of act abounds with negative consequences, that
fact could point to the presence of an intrinsic evil. These observations
having been made, the particular arguments will now be considered.
Some Accidental Arguments
Hadley Arkes, a contributing editor of Crisis Magazine, recently
reported on a meeting of the Life Forum held in January 2000 in
Washington, D.C. 2 The meeting involved a panel discussion on the
question of rescuing frozen embryos which manifested the tendency to
focus on accidental points in the debate.
Sparking the discussion was one Fr. Richard Hogan of Priests for
Life, who spoke tentatively in favor of "embryo rescue." But the responses
elicited did not address the core question of the object of the act.
One participant, an ethicist, opposed "embryo rescue" as "a form of
complicity that merely sustains an evil practice .. .it could involve the
mating of strangers, and at times in exchange for cash."3 This intervention
was valuable because the same ethicist did not oppose in vitro fertilization
(IVF), thus illustrating most starkly the inclination to focus on accidental
arguments. Surely if embryo transfer is an evil act it is so at least partly
because it violates some of the same principles that undergird the
opposition to IVF!
Another participant, a former director of an adoption agency,
opposed the adoption of embryos for similar reasons. He added that it
would encourage women to "rent" their wombs; it would break down
people's wariness with regard to IVF; and it would divert hopeful parents
from adopting already born infants that need a home.
Again, we are here dealing with accidental arguments. Certainly
there exist actions which are not evil in and of themselves but which
nevertheless carry with them the possibility of bad consequences. This
230
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point was drawn out by participant Michael Schwartz, who noted that it is
not immoral to "rescue" those conceived in other immoral manners, e.g.,
through fornication or adultery or rape. To argue that doing so should be
avoided because it might encourage those evil acts is fallacious . We are
dealing with a human person's life - should the chance to save it be passed
up for such reasons? True enough, we might add. But what if the act of
embryo rescue involves an intrinsic evil?
Finally, another participant of the Life Forum meeting argued that
embryo rescue is not only licit, but that it involves an obligation - at least
an abstract obligation on the part of society, if not a concrete obligation for
a particular woman. Germain Grisez has argued this point as wel1. 4 Clearly
we have here a presumption in favor of embryo transfer not being
intrinsically evil.
An Italian newspaper article of July 1996 reported on another nonessential argument, this time given by Archbishop Elio Sgreccia, the
director of the Bioethics Center at the Universita' Cattolica di Roma, and
the vice president of the Pontifical Academy for Life. 5 That argument says
that a program to rescue frozen embryos will serve to legitimize IVF and
lessen the guilt of IVF practitioners. Archbishop Sgreccia was quoted as
saying:
L'idea di una organizzazione sistematica dell 'adozione prenatale
degli embrioni jinirebbe per legittimare la pratica che e ' alia base
del problema. L'adozione jinirebbe per attenuare anche il senso di
responsibilita ' morale di chi continua a congelare embrioni,
rassicurato dal Jatto che tanto ci sara ' qualcuno che Ii adottera '6

Mauro Cozzoli, a professor at the Pontifical Lateran University in
Rome, has seconded this precise point and has elaborated on it. In a
compendium entitled "The Status and Identity of the Human Embryo," he
writes:
However, this [embryo "adoption" or "rescue"] does not constitute a
solution to the problem. Above all because it is an extraordinary7
means, to which no one can be obligated and which cannot become
ordinary. Besides becoming an undifferentiated means of access to
maternity (for any woman or couple, in any condition), it would
favor recourse to maternity separated from matrimony and sexuality.8
It is also a disproportionate means to deal with and resolve a problem
of enormous dimensions and in progressive expansion. One fails to
glimpse either the will to resolve this problem or even the beginnings
of projected solutions. Furthermore, in the absence of a willingness
and an agreement to cease the practice of the production and freezing
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of embryos, the systematic recourse to adoptive pregnancy can have
the effect of legitimizing and motivating that practice. 9

As can be seen, this is not an argument about the intrinsic value of
the act of ET considered under the species of rescue. It incorporates the
circumstances and conditions surrounding such a proposal, as do the
preceding arguments just reviewed (either pro or con).
That having been said, the observation must be made that an
evaluation of such accidental circumstances is an important contributor in
deciding whether or not an action may be undertaken. Were the act of
embryo transfer not intrinsically evil, it could still be argued that it is
wrong to undertake the proposal. The circumstances of a morally good or
indifferent act can vitiate that act and make it blameworthy. In order for an
act to be considered a good act to commit, the object, the intention and the
circumstances must all be good. A good object does not suffice, in
accordance with the principle: malum ex qualunque defectu, bonum ex
integra causa.
The above discussion was done by way of highlighting the
difference between arguments pertaining to the object of the act and
arguments pertaining to the circumstances. With regard to an evil intention
(such as ET for profit motives), the so-called finis operantis, the reader can
easily discern.

Arguments Touching Upon the Object of the Act
Next we will examine the arguments which deal with embryo
transfer inasmuch as it is an act which is either intrinsically evil or morally
good or at least indifferent. Germain Grisez has laid out a stance that can
be a useful starting point for this discussion. In writing to a woman who is
contemplating having her dead sister's frozen embryo implanted in her
womb, he states:
Nurturing the baby in your womb surely will not be wrong; if
someone transferred an embryo to your womb without your consent,
abortion would be wrong, and it would be your duty to nurture the
baby, just as it is the duty of a woman who has been raped and finds
herself pregnant. 10

Obviously, Grisez is making the valid point that, as he says,
"nurturing the baby in your womb surely would not be wrong." In other
words, it would clearly be immoral to abort such a pregnancy. But it does
not follow that the pregnancy is normal. In the case of the rape victim,
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notwithstanding the injustice of the rape, the child is still the very offspring
of the raped and impregnated woman. The baby within her womb is right
where he or she should be, i.e., within the sanctuary of his own mother's
womb. This would not hold true in the hypothetical case of a woman who
is forced to have an embryo implanted within her womb (in the case of
heterologous ET). Such a baby would be out of his or her "natural place."
It is a strangely anomalous situation. But the debate here is about the
embryo transfer itself, and this is just what Grisez has to say next:
Thus, if anythjng makes your project intrinsically wrong, it must be
having the embryo moved from the freezer into your womb. But
that is not at odds with any basic human good. It protects life rather
than violates it; since the new person already exists, it does not violate
the transmjssion of life; and it has nothing to do with the good of
marriage, because it is not a sexual act, and the relationshjp
between you and the baby is neither marital nor a perverse alternative
to the marital relationship ... Though superficially similar to acts

violating various goods involved in marriage and procreation,
what you propose to do is not the same as any of them. In
choosing to receive the embryo into your womb, you would be
committing yourself to only one thing: trying to save ills or her life. I I

If this statement is true, then we have a legitimate defense of embryo
transfer. However, there are several authors who put forth contradictory
arguments - arguments which challenge particularly Grisez's assertion that
embryo transfer, "has nothing to do with the good of marriage, because it is
not a sexual act, and the relationship between you and the baby is neither
marital nor a perverse alternative to the marital relationship."
If one could imagine his opponents asking a collective question to
Grisez, it would be along these lines: "How can it be said that a woman
getting pregnant and carrying a child has nothing to do with the good of
marriage, or that it does not pertain somehow to sexuality?"

The Argument of Mary Geach
The first line of argument opposing the "rescue" of frozen embryos
is offered by the English philosopher (and mother) Mary Geach. In an
article written in 1999, she argues passionately against embryo transfer as
being an offense against chastity.
Put succinctly, Geach maintains that the woman's part of the "act of
generation" is the laying open of her womb to the impregnating
intromission of the man. This is an act of admission of the kind that causes
pregnancy. To submit to embryo transfer, an act of technological
August, 2002
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impregnation, is to dissociate essential aspects of the marital act. Thus,
embryo transfer is unchaste.
Geach's article is not always focused precisely on her main thesis.
She begins by criticizing embryo transfer as an intrinsic evil, as an
"indecent solution"1 2 to the dilemma of orphaned embryos. It is indecent
"that women should submit to technological impregnation, and should
bear in their wombs children which are not their own."1 3
The immediate question one could ask is about homologous embryo
transfer, i.e., the technological implantation of a woman's own embryo
conceived with her own husband. 14 Her ensuing argument does attempt to
exclude this alternative as well, but there is some ambiguity in her initial
articulation of her point.

Does Embryo Transfer Connote Surrogacy?
Geach also seems to think that embryo transfer involves the evil of
surrogacy. Her concern must be looked at vis-a-vis the Magisterium's use
of the term. The Catechism of the Catholic Church has this to say about
surrogacy:
Techniques that entail the dissociation of husband and wife, by the
intrusion of a person other than the couple (donation of sperm or
ovum, surrogate uterus), are gravely immoral. 1s

It is interesting that the Catechism uses the expression surrogate
"uterus." The Latin editio typica is as follows:
Technicae artes, quae parentum provocant dissociationem per
interventum personae a matrimonio alienae (spermatis vel ovocyti
donum, uteri commodatum) graviter sunt inhonestae. 16

But Geach asserts:
If it is all right to "adopt" an embryo, it follows that the act of
admission, whereby a woman allows herself to be made pregnant
with a child not her own, is not an intrinsically evil kind of act. But if
it is not an intrinsically evil kind of act, it is hard to see that there is
anything wrong with surrogate motherhood. If we can dissociate
surrogacy from IVF, then why should there be any objection to it?1 7

Here she stands with Msgr. William Smith of St. Joseph's Seminary
in Dunwoodie, New York. 18 But this assertion is untrue, at least if we
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restrict ourselves to the definition of surrogacy given by the Congregation
for the Doctrine of the Faith in Donum Vitae. In that (authoritative)
document we find the following definition:
By "surrogate mother" the Instruction means:
a) The woman who carries in pregnancy an embryo implanted in her uterus
and who is genetically a stranger to the embryo because it has been obtained
through the union of the gametes of "donors." She carries the pregnancy
with a pledge to surrender the baby once it is born to the party who
commissioned or made the agreement/or the pregnancy.
b) The woman who carries in pregnancy an embryo to whose procreation she
has contributed the donation of her own ovum, fertilized through
insemination with the sperm of a man other than her husband. She carries
the pregnancy with a pledge to surrender the baby once it is born to the
party who commissioned or made the agreement/or the pregnancy. 19

As we can see from this citation, the Church does not define
surrogate motherhood in a way which would need to fall under Geach's
condemnation of embryo transfer just considered. For instance, the CDF
does not mention at all homologous IVF and ET. Geoffrey Surtees20 and
Germain Grisez 21 have also effectively shown that surrogacy is not
necessarily part of the equation in embryo transfer, whether hetero- or
homologous.
Surrogacy involves a contract to conceive and bear a child for
another person. The surrogate mother is simply and crudely "renting her
womb" for a time. But there need not be such an immoral contract in
"embryo rescue," although there could be, and then the evil of surrogacy
would be involved in addition to the rescue effort, if the latter is in fact
intrinsically immoral. But it is simply not correct to say that one must
employ the means of surrogacy - as defined by the CDF - to obtain the end
of embryo rescue. The means is something other than surrogacy: it is
embryo transfer or technological implantation.
If we analyze Geach's last citation in this light, we can respond that it
does not follow that because surrogate motherhood is intrinsically evil then
so must be "embryo rescue." The evil of surrogate motherhood can lie
simply in the contract aspect. Perhaps it also lies in the embryo transfer as
well, but that remains to be seen.
Then she says: "If we can dissociate surrogacy from IVF, then why
should there be any objection to it?"22 "It" is presumably "surrogate
motherhood." Can we not say that we are debating an issue which
demonstrates clearly that it is certainly possible to dissociate surrogacy
from IVF? In vitro fertilization does not involve surrogacy in its
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homologous variety, and even if it be heterologous, "embryo rescue" is a
morally distinct act from surrogate motherhood.

More than Two Sexes!A Third Parent
Geach also argues that embryo transfer of someone else's genetic
child "will thus increase the number of the sexes: there will be fathers, and
mothers, and bearers."23 Is that what "sex" signifies? One would object that
"sex" is determined by genetics - it is laid out in the karotype or
chromosomal blueprint of a given person - and not by relationship to
others.
She next states that, "The bearer, it may be added, is likely to have a
powerful influence on development, and can fairly be regarded as a third
parent."24 "Parenthood" is a broad concept. So is the idea of "influencing
development." Needless to say, in conventional adoption, the new
"parents" also have a profound influence on the child's "development." We
see no objections to that. Nor do we accede that this particular principle
Geach is seeking to establish against "embryo rescue" poses any real threat
to the moral order. Nevertheless, this concern voiced by Geach might be
the undeveloped kernel of a more profound issue, viz., that a relationship
between mother and child is formed which excludes her husband in a
manner harmful to the marital union.

Wet Nursing vis-A-Vis Embryo Transfer
Geach next laces several strains of thought together in an argument
comparing wet-nurses and embryo-rescuing women. 25 Rightly, we believe,
Geach criticizes the proposition that "embryo rescue" is analogous to wetnursing. 26 But she begins her critique in a strange way. "A wet-nurse used
to be paid, and it was fair enough that she should be,"27 Geach notes. Then,
implying that "embryo rescue" means surrogate motherhood, she warns us
that wealthy women could, on this right-to-payment principle, become the
mothers of outrageous numbers of children - "hundreds" even - and "all
without sin."28 She adds,
If you think it permissible to pay a woman for this service, these
problems will arise ... [Or] perhaps you think it impermissible to pay
a woman for such a service. You have a problem with the old wetnUfses ... why is it wrong to be paid for it?29

The response to this is that it has already been established (in Donum
Vitae) that surrogate motherhood arrangements are immoral. But we are
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not arguing about that. And whether or not wet-nurses should be paid is
completely immaterial to the topic. However, even if wet-nurses should
have been paid, it does not follow that paying (or financially assisting) an
embryo-rescuing woman is immoral or outrageous. The point is that she
should not be a surrogate. That means there should not be a contract to
conceive and carry the child for another woman, with or without payment.
That notwithstanding, Geach is correct in stating that wet-nursing
and "embryo rescue" are dissimilar acts. They are not analogous. She at
first simply argues against the analogy between them by trying to show
what she feels are the unacceptable contractual consequences of making
them analogous. But the reason they are not analogous is more profound.
She says that between the two there is a "morally relevant difference:"
The difference is that the act of admission, whereby one allows
oneself to be made pregnant, is usually the female part of the act of
generation. The act of accepting a child for nursing never is. The act
of generation is normally the human act through which a woman is
made pregnant, the human act through which she is made liable to
give birth. By this act she is not merely committed to pregnancy; by
this act she is made pregnant, as no subsequent choice on her part is
usually needed if her pregnancy and giving birth are to occur. This
fact about the marriage act is obviously important to it as a marriage
act; but it is a fact which also holds for technological impregnation,
whether with semen or with an already existing embryo.30

The Dissociation of the Parts of the Marital Act
Thus, for Geach, technological implantation mimics, in a sense, the
marriage act, because it supplants the father and ignores the unitive aspect
altogether. It is like the marriage act because in both cases the woman lays
herself open in an act ordered by its nature to make her pregnant. In
Geach's line of reasoning, whether or not the impregnation is through
semen or an embryo is irrelevant. The point is that she is made pregnant
outside of the marital embrace. That, she goes on to argue, is an offense
against chastity.3)
This would be a broadening of the traditional conception of the virtue of
chastity, however. Fr. Kevin Flannery, SJ., the Dean of the Faculty of
Philosophy at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome, points out that
chastity is the virtue which regulates concupiscence.32 Since there is no
concupiscence in embryo transfer, it is fallacious to say chastity is violated.
St. Thomas' explanation of the virtue of chastity likewise leaves no room
for Geach's assertion. 33
August, 2002
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Nevertheless, we can see that Geach is developing a line of argument
in which we are not simply dealing with what happens to a child (whether
or not he or she is treated in a manner commensurate with human dignity),
but with what happens to the woman (whether or not her chastity is
safeguarded). This is an important point, because there is the danger that,
in seeking to preserve the life of the embryonic baby, one might neglect a
due consideration of the woman's integrity.
Geach's argument depends upon whether or not she can establish
that, in technological implantation,
One dissociates the parts of the marriage act from one another, thus
destroying in oneself the full sense of the significance of man in all
his psychophysical unity.34

She rightly notes that the "inseparability principle" holding together
the procreative and unitive aspects of the marital act affects both sexual
morality and reproductive technology. But she goes on to maintain that
there is an even more general principle at stake: it is immoral to use "one
part of the marriage act out of context."35
We believe that Geach establishes this principle in order to stave off
those who might say that in "embryo rescue" the inseparability principle is
not at stake at all, since the procreative aspect was already fulfilled in the
conception of the embryo, albeit illicitly. The objection might be raised
that one is not employing a means which violates the inseparability
principle (and thus, so the argument would go, the good of marriage is not
impinged) - that one is simply seeking to preserve a human life. Thus, if
marriage is not harmed because the inseparability principle remains intact,
and life is served, wherein lies the moral problem?
Continuing with Geach's argument, she states:
The fact that one is laying oneself open to an impregnating
intromission is a vital part of the self-giving involved in the woman 's
part of the marriage act. This self-giving is not just a self-giving to
the possible child, but to the father, since it would be hi s child that
she would be bearing. The man gives up a part of himself in the
marriage act, committing the fruit of the act to the womb of the
woman; the woman's complementary act of self-giving is to lay
herself open, to surrender her body to an impregnating kind of act
whose consequence is to occupy and use her whole body .. . [But in
"embryo rescue"] what is being asked of women is that they take a
vital part of the marriage act, and perform it without the father. 36
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This is the heart of the argument of Mary Geach against the proposal
that women adopt frozen embryos. An important complement to her stance
is provided by the Australian ethicist, Nicholas Tonti-Filippini, whose
position we will take up next.

The Position of Nicholas Tonti-Filippini
Tonti-Filippini, like Mary Geach, hones in on the effect that embryo
transfer has on marriage. He recognizes the intrinsic dignity of the poor
frozen embryo, but notes,
The rights of the child are not the only intrinsic issue. The question of
the unity of marriage, the dignity of the spouses, and their fidelity to
each other are at issue.37

Elaborating on this point, he cites from Donum Vitae's condemnation
of heterologous artificial insemination, suggesting that the principle
invoked therein also touches somehow upon the question of "embryo
rescue".38 The full passage is as follows:
Human procreation has specific characteristics by virtue of the
personal dignity of the parents and of the children: the procreation of
a new person, whereby the man and the woman collaborate with the
power of the Creator, must be the fruit and the sign of the mutual
self-giving of the spouses, of their love and of their fidelity [citing
Gaudium et Spes, 50]. The fidelity of the spouses in the unity of the
marriage involves reciprocal respect of their right to become afather
and a mother only through each other. 39

"Becoming a Mother or a Father"
The italicized sentence presents an insight for Tonti-Filippini into
why he thinks embryo transfer is immoral, although he admits that the
context in which it was written does not directly address our question
(Msgr. William Smith also detects such a connection40 ).
It is to be noted that what "becoming a mother or a father" precisely
means is somewhat ambiguous, as Tonti-Filippini recognizes. But he does
use the passage as a springboard into his discussion of marriage and the
marital act. What this passage must mean is that a person must not become
a parent through some agent other than one's spouse. If Donum Vitae sees
this as a right of the respective spouses, then there must be a corresponding
obligation not to let this happen, since a right is the corollary of an
August, 2002
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obligation. In fact, there must be a moral norm involved prohibiting such a
proposal.
The potential flaw in this argument is that the woman does not
"become a mother" in the truest sense of the term, i.e., the genetic sense. In
normal adoption a woman can "become a mother" by analogy (in the
nurturing or social sense). In embryo "adoption" she would also be the
gestational mother, but this latter state also lacks the ultimate sense of
motherhood. It is motherhood by analogy, and upon this point hinges the
argument intimated above about the parents' right to become parents only
through each other.
The strength of the argument lies in the manifest reality that
becoming a "gestational mother" involves an engagement of the woman's
maternal potential in an utterly unique way - a way which is not realized in
post-natal adoption. Something happens to the woman in embryo transfer
which impacts profoundly on her reproductive and maternal self. We think
that Mauro Cozzoli is on the same conceptual wavelength when he says, as
was cited earlier, that,
Besides becoming an undifferentiated means of access to maternity
(for any woman or couple, in any condition), it [embryo transfer]
would favor recourse to maternity separated from matrimony and
sexuality.4J

The question then turns on the degree to which the woman separates
her maternity from matrimony and sexuality. Does this occur in embryo
transfer to an extent which violates any moral norms?

Embryo Transfer is not "Adoption"
Continuing, Tonti-Filippini rejects the terminology that facilely calls
embryo transfer/rescue "adoption," for the following reason:
It is one thing for a couple ... to welcome into their home an

abandoned, orphaned or neglected child, it is quite another matter
for a woman to be made pregnant, by a medical procedure, with
a child not of her marriage. To equate this to adoption ignores her
psychosomatic unity, and the unity "in one flesh" of her marriage,
and hence her personal integrity and the integrity of the couple's
marriage. The phrase "pre-natal" adoption ought to be rejected
because it is implicitly dualistic in its over-simplification. 42

Adoption is really a remote end for which the embryo transfer and
rescue is undertaken. The relationship that is formed between mother and
240
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baby in this case is really of a different order than in what we ordinarily
call "adoption."

"No Possibility of Their Being Offered a Safe
Means of Survival which can be Licitly Pursued"
Tonti-Filippini couples his observation on Donum Vitae II, A, 1 with
a reference to the CDF's oft-cited yet somewhat problematic statement:
Every human being is to be respected for himself, and cannot be
reduced in worth to a pure and simple instrument for the advantage of
others. It is therefore not in conformity with the moral law deliberately
to expose to death human embryos obtained in vitro.43 In consequence
of the fact that they have been produced in vitro, those embryos which
are not transferred into the body of the mother and are called 'spare' are
exposed to an absurd fate, with no possibility of their being offered a
safe means of survival which can be licitly pursued.44

Interpreted as "Still a Possibility"
Whether or not this passage should be interpreted against "embryo
rescue" has been contested; firstly, because the Latin editio typica can be
translated variously. Instead of rendering the Latin non pateant into: "no
possibility," it can be rendered as: "with no well known [or clear or
manifest]" safe means of survival which can be licitly pursued."45
Secondly, as Grisez points out, this passage and its apparently
absolute prohibition to resolving the embryos' fate "occurs in a section in
which the document is concerned with using embryos produced in vitro as
subjects of experimental research." 46
Thirdly, the Pope himself (albeit in a non-authoritative address) has
used even less conclusive language in reference to these embryos:
There seems to be no morally licit solution regarding the human
destiny of the thousands and thousands of 'frozen' embryos which
are and remain the subjects of essential rights and should therefore be
protected by law as human persons. 47

Interpreted as "No Possibility"
Since this specific point is of such importance, a digression here is in
order. Donum Vitae' s celebrated passage about spare embryos,
notwithstanding the three observations just made above, could be
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interpreted contrarily - to imply that their transference into the womb is
immoral because such a transference is an act which is inherently flawed.
Pirstly, the COP's statement is rather overarching in tone, not
specific. If the COP merely wanted to state that experimenting on the spare
embryos is illicit, then why did it make such a seemingly absolute
declaration about there being no licit solution to their absurd fate? The
COP could have just condemned experimentation (which, by the way,
would seem redundant in light of everything that Donum Vitae had already
stated about the dignity of the embryos). Instead it said there was "no
possibility of their being offered a safe means of survivaL which can be
licitly pursued." Experimenting on them has nothing to do with the
proposal to offer them a safe means of survival.
Secondly, in the above citation from the Holy Pather's address, he
likewise does not unambiguously restrict his remark to situations where
the question of experimentation is the sole issue. In fact, he explicitly
refers not only to the section in Donum Vitae on experimentation, but also
to the section on interventions upon procreation. He says that,
The iIIicitness of these interventions on the origin of life and on
human embryos has already been stated (cf. Donum Vitae, I, 5 [on
experimentation]; II [on procreation]) .. .48

The third counterpoint is in relation to Geoffrey Surtees' critique. He
maintains that the statement only applies to the practitioners of lYE
I submit that the CDF is speaking here from the perspective of the
acting persons who have freely adopted by choice the intelligible,
though illicit proposal of artificial reproduction; and, hence, not
those who would wish to "rescue" these embryos through adoption.
In other words, for those who choose the methods of in vitro
f ertilization, it is in fact true that there are no licit means of handling
the "spares" begotten from the IYF procedure; this is because any
action the parties choose to adopt with respect to the "spares" would
be to deny the fundamental rights of the embryo(s) to enjoy gestation
and birth in his natural mother; and, after birth, to be raised and
educated by the same. Even if the couple were to envision giving up
their "spares" for adoption, this too would be wrong, and for the
same reason: it would deny the children the parental love they are by
natural justice entitled to from their original parents. It is never licit
to reject one's own child .. .49

The first observation on Surtees is that we are here speaking of
embryos that the genetic parents do not want implanted. That is what the
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CDF specified in its statement by the use of the word "spare." This is a
recognition by the CDF that the genetic parents are out of the picture. So it
seems as if the CDF is not at all speaking from the perspective of those
who choose the methods of in vitro fertilization. The statement is merely a
comment on the fate of these abandoned babies.
The second observation is that, with Surtees, we agree that planning
in advance to conceive and then abandon a baby is assuredly evil. Women
pursuing IVF do this as a matter of routine. It is an undeniably despicable
aspect of the whole project. But we are beyond that point in this situation.
The embryos already exist. Given the fact that the genetic mother will not
accept them, what is their fate? The CDF at this moment says that there is
"no possibility of their being offered a safe means of survival which can be
licitly pursued." And the Holy Father says regarding their fate that "there
seems to be no morally licit solution."
The third observation is that, if Surtees is indeed correct and the
above observation is incorrect, then why would it be evil to give them up
for adoption at this juncture? At this stage of the game (the embryos are in
existence) it would in fact seem laudable for the genetic mother to permit
their adoption. If embryo transfer is not evil in and of itself (as Surtees
holds) then the mother would seem to be obliged to give them up for
adoption if she cannot bear them herself (we need to keep in mind that she
might have up to 20 of them). Women do this commonly with their babies.
But the CDF says that there is "no possibility of their being offered a safe
means of survival which can be licitly pursued." And the Holy Father says
regarding their fate that "there seems to be no morally licit solution."
Surtees is saying that the CDF statement means that the IVF
practitioners have no possibility of offering to the embryos a safe means of
survival which can be licitly pursued. We want to argue that this
interpretation is too problematic to truly portray the CDF's genuine
intention.
By analogy, we don't argue against the feeding and continued
sustenance of children who have been bred into slavery merely because the
contract illicitly to conceive and then sell them is evil. We would only do
so if there was something wrong with the feeding itself. But we don't say
anything like, In consequence of the fact that they have been conceived
illicitly and as slaves those children which are not sold and are called
'spare' are exposed to an absurd fate, with no possibility of their being
offered a safe means of survival which can be licitly pursued.
All these observations are by way of showing that perhaps the CDF's
condemnation does apply in the context of "embryo rescue" as well as in
outright surrogacy arrangements.
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The Generative Continuum
Tonti-Filippini forthrightly states that embryo transfer violates the
inseparability principle and that it furthermore "brings about the
dislocation of the generative continuum. "50 Herein might be found a key to
showing that it is intrinsically evil. Tonti-Filippini asks whether our
Tradition refers only to the marital act and fertilization when it speaks
about the transmission of life. He says this is a reductionist approach which
disrupts the continuum from "fertilization and embryo formation to
implantation to embryonic and then foetal development."51 Pope Paul VI
wrote in Humanae Vitae:
In fact, just as man does not have unlimited dominion over his body
in general, so also, with particular reason, he has no dominion over
his generative faculties as such, because of their intrinsic ordination
towards raising up life, of which God is the principle.52

While we can say that from the perspective of the already-conceived
embryo this point is moot; from the perspective of the not-yet-pregnant
woman it is very pertinent: her generative faculties are being engaged in
this particular case outside of marriage.
However, can one not view a caesarian section in the same way, i.e.,
as a disruption of the "generative continuum?" But perhaps the answer is
that a caesarian section only assists, and does not actually replace the
natural process of birthing.
One could also say the same for any procedure to resolve an ectopic
pregnancy by surgically or technologically moving the embryo into the
womb where it is ordained to implant by nature. The woman is already
pregnant, the transference of the embryo only assists the pregnancy, it does
not initiate the pregnancy, as does ET (since a woman can rightly be said to
be pregnant when she conceives and not only when the embryo implants in
her womb).

The Relationship Between Mother and Child
The next point addressed by Tonti-Filippini is one whkh Geach also
touches upon, but without developing it to the same extent or with the same
degree of articulation. Geach writes that: "The bearer, it might be added, is
likely to have a powerful influence on development, and can fairly be
regarded as a third parent."53 The intuition manifested in this statement, it
could be maintained, is along the same lines as what the Australian ethicist
explains:
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The intimate relationship between mother and child during
pregnancy has no parallel. She and the child instantiate a unique
union. Within marriage, that union is not separate from but rather an
extension and an embodiment of the union between the woman and
her husband. That the child arises through the creating hand of God
as a gift called forth by their union has the significance of not
displacing but rather enriching their union. 54

Tonti-Filippini applies this line of argument to heterologous embryo
transfer:
The husband is isolated from this process by which his wife becomes
with child. Her body, which she gave to him in love in the sacrament
of marriage, a gift which they renew in the conjugal act, for a time
becomes the home of a child which bears no relationship to him,
which is from outside their union. It is in this sense that heterologous
embryo transfer is an infidelity to marriage. The pregnancy is
achieved outside the marital relationship. 55

One could respond that the objection that the child "bears no
relationship" to the father does not hold for homologous ET, and thus not
for ET in and of itself. But the last sentence quoted also serves as an
objection to the latter scenario as well: the pregnancy is achieved outside
the marital relationship. This is equally true of homologous ET as well.
Tonti-Filippini argues consistently from the standpoint of
heterologous ET, as has been noted. Some of his points would not pertain if
one wanted to show that ET is intrinsically evil. But in his thesis he
progressively tightens the vice on ET in any circumstance. Embryo
transfer involves the giving of a woman of herself in a way which is
properly exclusive to marriage. In either type of embryo transfer, with hers
and her husband's progeny or with that of another couple, the woman is
impregnated outside of the marital act (even if not by way of artificial
insemination). Therefore the good which is undermined is not the good of
human life, but the good of the institution of marriage, and this perforce is
an undermining of exclusivity and fidelity. His words are worth quoting in
full at this point:
Having given herself, her psychosomatic unity, faithfully, exclusively,
totally, and in a fully human way in marriage [here he cites Humanae
Vitae, n. 9], a woman is not free to give herself outside marriage in
this way, however altruistic the purpose and however desperate the
plight of those to whom she wishes to give herself. This is so because
her generative capacity, which includes her capacity to bear a
child in her womb, and not just her capacity to produce ova and
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to express her love in the conjugal act, belongs to the marital
union, and hence may not be given outside marriage. In these
ways, but not with all its viciousness, heterologous embryo transfer
is akin to adultery. Heterologous embryo transfer is at best a
mistaken, misguided charity though an extraordinarily generous
charity. But the mistake is a very grave mistake striking as it does at
the very dignity of the woman and her marriage.56

The bolded statement is the essence of his argument, and it is
thematically the same as that of Mary Geach: the generative capacity in its
totality belongs to the marital union.
The only two ways to counter this would be to show: first, that the
generative capacity in its totality simply need not belong to marriage; or
secondly, that becoming pregnant and carrying a child in a woman's womb
(impregnation and gestation) does not involve the generative capacity. In
other words, one would have to demonstrate that the generative capacity is
restricted to having a woman's ovum fertilized by a male gamete - that it
essentially involves nothing further.
However, if Tonti-Filippini argues correctly, then the embryotransferring doctor or technician is analogous to an adulterer or a
fornicator, as the case may be (i.e., whether it be heterologous or
homologous ET),
Because it is by his or her act that the woman becomes pregnant. That
this is so highlights the reality that the achievement of a pregnancy in
this way is outside marriage and hence an infidelity to the marriage. 57

Embryo transfer would violate marital fidelity and exclusivity on two
scores at least: it excludes the father from the relationship with the child
and/or it excludes him from the act whereby the woman is made to be
pregnant. Tonti-Filippini encapsules his argument thusly:
The profound notion of marital communion, of the two in one flesh, is
broken by the use of the generative capacity of the woman in her
bearing a pregnancy in a way which isolates her husband, which
excludes him from this part of her life, because he makes no direct
contribution to the pregnancy and it is established in her as a result of
an embryo transfer procedure performed outside the context of their
expression of conjugal love. She becomes pregnant and he is not the
father. He has no part in the pregnancy. The child is not an expression
of their union. Her body, which they share in their complete love, is
then temporally given to another union, the union between her and the
child she carries, and that union does not include him as it would if the
child were the fruit of their own union. In this there is infidelity to the
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marriage covenant and there is a lack of respect for the dignity of
both the man and woman because of a lack of respect for the dignity
of their marriage. 58

The Position of Helen Watt
Our next interlocutor is Helen Watt. She adopts the counterposition
that rescuing and "adopting" frozen embryos by embryo transfer is a
morally licit option. 59
Like Mary Geach, and against Germain Grisez, Watt rejects the
analogy of embryo transfer with wet-nursing. She says pregnancy, unlike
nursing, "makes a woman a mother."60
Unlike Geach (and, we might add, unlike Msgr. Smith), and with
Grisez, she also rejects the identification of embryo transfer as surrogacy.
Watt locates the evil of surrogacy in the contract to bear a child on
another's behalf.
"It is therefore wrong to plan in advance of conception (or, if one is
not the genetic mother, in advance of gestation) to bear a child who
will be brought up by others."61

Watt also thinks it would be wrong for single women to "adopt"
frozen embryos.62 This is a position which Geach challenges directly.
While Geach doesn't accept embryo transfer in any case, as has been seen,
she questions the logic of people like Watt, who, once having admitted
embryo transfer in principle, then try to restrict its application. 63 But Watt
does so for non-essential reasons: single woman engaging in this practice
would be hard put to show that she does not accept IVF as morally licit.

a

I

Breaks in the Continuum

t

Despite all of these obserrations concerning Watt's article, she does
argue her point by way of trying to demonstrate that embryo transfer is not
evil in and of itself. She states her thesis at the outset of her article:
Ideally, pregnancy should have, I want to argue, a particular symbolic
content which has to do with both past and future - both with genetic
and social motherhood ... What I want to argue is that just as the
significance of pregnancy and birth with regard to future care need
not be present in the case of adoption after birth, the significance of
pregnancy and birth with regard to origin need not be present in the
case of adoption of an embryo. In the case of embryo adoption, birth
does have its normal significance with regard to the child's future
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care, but lacks its normal significance with regard to his or her origin
in an act of marital union. While embryo adoption does, it is true,
fragment the maternal role to some extent, it does not create any
more breaks in this role than does adoption after birth. 64

But can one not respond that the number of the breaks in the
continuum is not the issue? Rather, it is the nature of the breaks that is
morally significant. Watt intimates that she realizes this, but does not, in
our opinion, resolve the question. She states her unease with this point:
There is therefore some sense in which the significance of pregnancy
and birth with regard to origin is more important than its significance
with regard to future care. Why this is so I am not sure. 65

Watt offers some thoughts on why this could be, but her reasons only
deal with care and commitment, and not with the very act of becoming
pregnant. Geach would say that a bond is formed between mother and
child - a bond which, as Tonti-Filippini says, is "without parallel."
Watt maintains that the introduction into the family of the embryonic
child does not disrupt family relationships any more than does post-natal
adoption,
... given the fact that the links with the original mother and father
have already been severed, and given the fact that the child will be
both gestated and reared by the woman who has it transferred to her
womb. 66

It seems to us, however, as if the mother who "adopts" an embryo
will actually form a closer bond with the baby than a post-natal adoptive
mother. From the standpoint of the child there would be less of an
adjustment. Could a child who was adopted as an embryo, in a moment of
rebellion, ever challenge his or her adoptive mother by saying, "You are
not my mother?" Perhaps he or she could, but with less conviction than a
post-adoptive child. Maybe such a child could say, "You are not my
mother, you are merely the vehicle through which I was born."
In any case, Watt does not adequately account for the fact that the
father is excluded from the relationship in a way that does not occur in
norma] adoption. In the latter case, both father and mother welcome the
adopted baby in more or less the same sense. This is certainly not the
situation in embryo transfer, where there is a qualitative difference between
the relationships of each parent to the child. Embryo transfer establishes a
scenario more akin to a husband whose wife has a child by another man,
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yet decides nevertheless to raise that child as his own. Both Geach and
Tonti-Filippini focus on this reality in a way which Watt ignores.

Embryo Transfer and Chastity
Watt next analyzes Geach's proposition that embryo transfer is a
perverse or unchaste act. She says that,
The term "allowing oneself to be made pregnant" covers two quite
different intentions, which affect in different ways the morality of
what is being done. The first intention is to allow a child to come to
be - to be created - inside one's body ... Quite different from the
intention to have a child come to be inside one's body is the intention
to have a child put inside one's body.67

It is obvious that this point is true: a woman can be impregnated
when a child is conceived within her (as in normal intercourse or as in
artificial insemination techniques); or a woman can be impregnated when
an already conceived embryo is placed in her (as in IVF & ET techniques
or embryo "rescue").
Watt admits that artificial insemination substitutes the marital act
(which must precede conception). She asks if embryo transfer also
substitutes the marital act (in causing implantation).68 Her answer is that it
does not. And to argue this point she dissects the stages of what happens
between intercourse and gestation.

Intercourse as the Cause of Pregnancy
Accepting the moral principle that intercourse must directly cause,
and not merely precede conception, Watt asks,
Is uterine gestation also directly caused by intercourse, or is
intercourse not rather an event which normally precedes it? Surely,
what intercourse directly causes is the union of sperm and ovum, not
uterine gestation of the embryo so created. While the embryo's
creation within the mother's body is, indeed, caused, at least partly, by
intercourse, any subsequent positioning of the embryo, and any actual
implantation of the embryo, is brought about in other ways. For the
embryo to travel down the fallopian tube and implant in the womb, it
needs nothing further from its father, but simply the assistance of its
mother. The journey of the embryo is, after all, in a different direction ,
as well as involving a different subject, from the earlier journey of the
sperm. It is the mother and the embryo, not the father and mother, who
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cause the embryo to implant. It is therefore not the case that uterine
pregnancy - that is, pregnancy after implantation - is directly caused
by intercourse. 69

This sort of parcing of the events raises some serious questions that
need to be addressed. Firstly, we believe Watt uses the term "to cause" in
equivocal ways. It is one thing for an event to be caused by an act of man,
i.e., a mere human biological process that involves no voluntary decision
on the part of an agent. It is quite another to say that an event is caused by
a human act, i.e., a volitional act involving the moral order.
The reason this point must be discussed is that Watt concludes in the
above quotation that: It is therefore not the case that uterine pregnancy that is, pregnancy after implantation - is directly caused by intercourse.
But we do commonly consider the act of intercourse to be the moral
act eventuating in pregnancy. Indeed, common sense certainly regards
intercourse as the direct cause of pregnancy. If someone were to say: "Tom
and Susan had intercourse, but that is not the direct cause of her being
pregnant," we would rightly think that person mad!
Watt says that intercourse directly causes conception, but not
implantation and uterine pregnancy. However, to remain consistent with
her line of reasoning, would it not be truer to say that intercourse merely
causes the ejaculation of semen into the woman, and not conception itself?
The sperm affects conception without any further assistance from the
father. That this is true is evident from the fact that conception may even
take place against the father's will, but the ejaculation does not (normally).
She says that nothing further is needed from the father for the
embryo to travel down the fallopian tube, "simply the assistance of the
mother." But the "assistance of the mother" is needed no more than a
continued action of the father. The embryo travels the fallopian tube quite
happily all on his or her own.
Watt also introduces the term "uterine pregnancy" instead of just
"pregnancy." This does not seem to be a necessary distinction, morally
speaking. A woman is pregnant when a child comes to be within her. We
speak of ectopic pregnancy and abdominal pregnancy, for instance. We do
not speak as if such a mother were not pregnant at all because the embryo
has not implanted in her uterus.
We also treat in a morally sensitive way a woman who we even
suspect of having conceived, even if we think implantation has not yet
occurred (e.g. , in treating rape victims). Indeed, for those who incline
toward the opinion that a "pre-implantation" embryo is not a moral subject
or is somehow not yet an individual, this distinction is crucial. Conception
is really what is determinative for moral decision making in this case. And
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when a woman conceives, she is pregnant. Watt's use of the term "uterine
pregnancy" is tendentious. 70
These are important distinctions, because Watt depends upon this
line of reasoning for her conclusion:
It is therefore not the case that uterine pregnancy - that is,

pregnancy after implantation - is directly caused by intercourse.
If this is so, should it still be said that intercourse must always
precede uterine pregnancy? What I want to argue is that whereas
ideally intercourse should precede uterine pregnancy, the only
absolute moral requirement is that intercourse precede - and indeed,
directly cause, in vivo conception. 71

We think that Watt fails to establish the principle she enunciates, i.e.,
the only absolute moral requirement is that intercourse precede - and
indeed, directly cause, in vivo conception. The reason for the failure is
because she relies upon an inconsistent analysis of the events from
intercourse to what she calls "uterine pregnancy."
We have tried to show that intercourse in one very restricted and
physicalistic sense (in Watt's merely biological sense) can be said to
directly cause neither conception nor implantation nor uterine pregnancy;
that it is merely the direct cause of the ejaculation of the semen into the
woman. The rest is up to non-rational natural processes.
But intercourse is the direct cause, in a morally determinative sense,
of all three: conception, implantation and pregnancy. When a woman gets
pregnant, according to the order established by God, the only moral act
which is the direct cause of the pregnancy is intercourse. To say that the
moral act of intercourse is not the direct cause of pregnancy is untenable.
Watt seeks to parce the causality in the marital act in an inconsistent
manner. Now, in embryo transfer procedure, a woman is impregnated by
what can only be viewed as an act involving the moral order (the act of the
technician). In this sense it certainly does substitute the marital act.

Summary
We have seen in this paper that the question of embryo transfer as a
way to resolve the fate of frozen embryos can be considered under two
species of argument: accidental or essential. Accidental arguments cannot
resolve the question whether or not embryo transfer is intrinsically
immoral, yet serve to point out the potential dangers latent in it. Essential
arguments seek to show that ET is either intrinsically evil or not.
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Some accidental arguments against embryo transfer warn that this
solution involves the mating of strangers; diverts resources and adopting
couples from post-natal adoption options; entwines one in the evil of IVF;
breaks down society's moral wariness to IVF; lessens the guilt of IVF
technicians; and even serves to legitimize IVF overall.
The essential arguments seek to identify the moral object of the act in
this proposal to save the frozen embryos. Whether or not statements issuing
from the CDF and the Pope can be interpreted as closing the door to this
proposal is a debatable point. Some authors think that the proposal must
involve surrogate motherhood (Smith and Geach). Others view it as prenatal adoption (Surtees and Watts). Tonti-Filippini maintains that the term
pre-natal adoption must be rejected altogether. Another view identifies the
object of the act as rescue (our original position). Finally, some hold that
the object of the act is precisely transferring the embryo into the womb
(Grisez and May).
Those in favor of this project maintain that it has nothing to do with
the good of marriage since the baby is already in existence (Grisez, May,
Watts and Surtees). The opposing camp argues that it violates, variously:
the woman's chastity, the exclusive nature of the marital union, fidelity
and/or the very institution of marriage itself (Geach and Tonti-Filippini).
While Watts argues that the continuum of conception-gestation-birtheducation is only broken quantitatively, others hold that it is a qualitative
breach in what is rightly called the generative continuum, a breach which
is immoral (Geach and Tonti-Filippini). Watt justifies this breach by
referring to caesarian sections. Grisez has used the analogy of wet-nursing
to show that ET is not intrinsically evil, while others (Geach and Watts) say
that this analogy does not hold. Finally, those who argue in favor of
embryo transfer usually do not reject in principle single women or even
consecrated women as potential volunteers, but would reject this
alternative as a matter of prudence.

Conclusion
Drawing a conclusion as to the moral licitness of embryo transfer
proves to be a rather difficult endeavor. This conclusion is admittedly
tentative and we welcome the inevitable criticisms it will evoke as
essential to the process of uncovering the truth and elucidating the
question. The problems associated with this project certainly abound and
the arguments that have been raised against this project must be answered.
The rule or measure of this act of embryo transfer must be pregnancy
normally achieved, i.e., by a marital act performed in humano modo.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing arguments, it seems to us to be
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untenable to maintain that embryo rescue has nothing to do with the good
of marriage because it intimately involves a woman's reproductive
dimension. This procedure is clearly not necessary for the woman's health
and is non-therapeutic. It makes her pregnant. Can we not say that any time
a woman gets pregnant the good of marriage is somehow affected, even if
only in virtue of the fact that it is ignored or even rejected by the
impregnating agents?
True, in embryo rescue the marital act in not directly involved. For
this reason it seems unfounded to hold that the virtue of chastity is
offended. There is no venereal vice involved at all; no surrender to the
movements of concupiscence.
But God has established that the marital act be the cause of
pregnancy. Anything else is in fact an aberration. And embryo transfer
circumvents the marital act in making a woman pregnant. Granted, the
rescuing woman may not be intending to subvert marriage in consenting to
this sort of impregnation- she merely seeks to save a life - but the reality
is that she finds herself with new life in her womb in a manner which
obviates the marital act. She in fact commits an act which engages her
reproductive capacity outside of sexuality. This is not a foreseen but
unintended side effect, but is the directly willed and intended effect of her
act. She intends to transfer the embryo to her womb technologically. But
this is the same as intending to do so in a manner which is not the marital
act. Her purpose might not be to get pregnant outside of the marital act, but
what she freely chooses to do (her "intelligible proposal adopted by
choice") is precisely that: get pregnant, technologically. It seems
impossible to say that this is not the same as getting pregnant outside of the
marital act.
This reproductive capacity of the woman stands apart from the other
human body systems because of its manifest moral connection with the
marital bond. It really does belong to marriage. Thus, utilizing one's
reproductive organs does not fall into the same category as, for example,
donating one's kidneys or blood. In offering the use of one's womb to an
abandoned embryo a profound relationship is formed between the woman
and child. We earlier noted that this is not motherhood in the ultimate
sense, i.e., the genetic sense. But it is motherhood in a sense beyond that
resultant in post-nata] adoption (it is gestational motherhood). Post-natal
adoption does not engage a woman's reproductive capacity, but embryo
transfer most assuredly does so.
Therefore the woman establishes a type of relationship with the child
that is unequal with her husband (if she has one). This is not an accidental
difference. It does not result because she spends more time with the baby
or is kinder and more nurturing and perhaps more concerned with the baby's
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future, etc. It is a difference which is part and parcel of the project to
transfer and gestate the baby. The bodiliness of the woman/embryo
relationship is morally significant, especially since we do not accept a
dualistic anthropology. The woman's body does not become a mere
incubator for the new baby.
Thus, there seems to be a real dissociation of the husband and wife in
embryo transfer inasmuch as her pregnancy and her impregnation have no
connection to him. If the embryo happens to be his very own progeny, then
at least the implantation procedure excludes him. The woman stands in
relation to the child in a way which excludes the man (or a man). As Mauro
Cozzoli fears, this is maternity separated from sexuality and marriage. But
Donum Vitae (II, A, 1) has warned that husband and wife have a right to
become parents only through each other.
Pope Paul VI in Humanae Vitae taught that man has no dominion
over his generative faculty as such. But this project, albeit good in purpose,
extends the dominion of man over woman's generative capacity by causing
her to become pregnant by an act of technology.
Therefore we propose the following analysis of the project of
embryo rescue:
The finis operantis (the purpose for which the act is undertaken) is
noble and good: to save the frozen embryo'S life with a further end of
adopting and raising the child.
The circumstances are commensurate with the purpose: the baby is
abandoned by his or her mother; is absurdly cryopreserved; the baby will
eventually perish or be murdered without some action being taken; a
woman is willing to have the procedure performed and adopt the baby; etc.
The moral object of the act is "transfer the embryo to a woman's
womb." This is the same as "technologically impregnate a woman."
Because this object appears to have inextricably built into it an
undermining of marriage since of its very nature it obviates the marital act
and/or excludes the husband so radically, it is not an object compatible
with the true good of man.
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